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INTRODUCTION

Courts are now facing the second generation of Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA")' preemption cases. "First generation" cases of FAA preemption involve
state laws that invalidate parties' agreements to arbitrate. Courts now routinely hold

* Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. I appreciate helpful
comments from Steve Ware, Amy Schmitz, Jean Sternlight, and participants in a faculty
workshop at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Thanks also to our
research librarian Rob Mead for his assistance.
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). These sections comprise Chapter 1 of the FAA, which deals
primarily with domestic arbitration. Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA apply to international
arbitration. See id. §§ 201-208, 301-307. My focus here is on domestic arbitration and hence
Chapter 1.
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such laws preempted, 2 as required by a line of Supreme Court cases dating from
Southland Corp. v. Keating.3 With those efforts to restrict the ongoing
"consumerization" 4 of arbitration stymied,5 state legislatures have begun adopting
laws that modify the parties' arbitration agreement rather than invalidating it,
regulating the arbitration process rather than the parties' obligation to arbitrate."
California, for example, now requires extensive disclosures by neutral arbitrators of

2. A recent sampling of cases includes: Brayman Constr. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 319
F.3d 622, 627 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that FAA preempts Pennsylvania rule precluding
arbitration of bad faith claims against insurance companies); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc.,
303 F.3d 496, 506 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that FAA preempts West Virginia rule
precluding arbitration of state human rights claims); Pine Ridge Coal Co. v. Loftis, 271 F.
Supp. 2d 905, 909 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (holding that FAA preempts West Virginia law
requiring courts rather than arbitrators to adjudicate worker's compensation claims); Central
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Fox, No. 1011121, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 193, at * 6 (Ala. June 27,
2003) (holding that FAA preempts Alabama statute precluding specific enforcement of predispute arbitration clause); Gayfer Montgomery Fair, Inc. v. Austin, No. 1012159, 2003 Ala.
LEXIS 205, at *26 (Ala. June 27, 2003) (same); Heaberlin Farms, Inc. v. IGA Ins. Co., 641
N.W.2d 816, 819 (Iowa 2002) (holding that FAA preempts Iowa law precluding
enforcement of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts); Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 669
N.W.2d 271, 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that FAA preempts Michigan law
precluding arbitration of state lemon law claims); McMillan v. Gold Kist, Inc., 577 S.E.2d
482, 486 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that FAA preempts South Carolina law requiring
conspicuous notice of arbitration clause); Blanton v. Stathos, 570 S.E.2d 565, 568 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (same).
3. 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987). Despite
the passage of time and the Supreme Court's reafflrmance of Southland in Allied-Bruce, 513
U.S. at 272-73, Southland's holding that the FAA applies in state court remains
controversial. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
4. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of
Arbitration, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 9 (1997); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Growing Debate
Over 'Consumerized' Arbitration: Adding Cole to the Fire, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
1997, at 20. Southland also contributed to the consumerization of arbitration in the first place
by removing state law restrictions on pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment contracts. See Southland,465 U.S. at 14-16.
5. Congress, of course, can override the FAA and make pre-dispute arbitration
agreements unenforceable, although to date it has done so only rarely. See 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 1226(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003) (making pre-dispute arbitration clauses in motor
vehicle franchise agreements unenforceable).
6. State laws precluding the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses for certain types of
claims or certain types of parties continue to apply (i.e., are not preempted) to arbitration
agreements not subject to the FAA. Some state courts have construed the scope of the FAA
(which applies to any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2000)) unduly narrowly so as to preserve a wider scope for state arbitration law, prompting
Supreme Court intervention. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 2041 (2003)
(per curiam) (holding that the "decision below... adheres to an improperly cramped view of
Congress's Commerce Clause power"); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-81 (rejecting
"contemplation of the parties" test and holding that the FAA extends to the full reach of
Congress's Commerce Clause power).
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potential conflicts of interest7 and has enacted statutes regulating the conduct of
institutions that administer consumer arbitrations.8 New Mexico, in adopting the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA"), 9 added a provision making a
"disabling civil dispute clause" °--which the statute defines as including a
provision that provides for a less convenient forum, reduced access to discovery, a
limited right to appeal, the inability to join class actions, or the like-voidable by
consumers, borrowers, tenants and employees in arbitration."
Courts have only begun to address preemption challenges to state laws
regulating the arbitration process-what I call "second generation" FAA
preemption cases. One such case reached the Supreme Court this past term in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 12 but the Court did not resolve the
preemption issue. The Supreme Court granted review in Bazzle to consider whether
the FAA preempted a South Carolina decision permitting courts to order arbitration
on a classwide, rather than individual, basis. 13 The plurality opinion never reached
the preemption issue, instead vacating the lower court's decision for the arbitrator
to consider in the first instance whether the parties' contract precluded classwide
arbitration.14 Three dissenting justices, however, would have held that the South
Carolina rule conflicted with the FAA and thus was preempted. 15 Second
generation preemption cases arise in a variety of other contexts as well, ranging
from arbitrator disclosure to standards for vacating awards. Their frequency will
only increase as more states adopt RUAA, 16 which includes a variety of provisions
that regulate arbitration procedures.
Despite the importance of FAA preemption, and particularly given the growth
in second generation FAA preemption cases, surprisingly little has been written
about the topic.17 And what has been written generally presents the author's own

7. Judicial Council of California, Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in
ContractualArbitration (effective Jan. 1, 2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov
rules/appendix/appdiv6.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.9(a) (West Supp. 2003).
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.92 (prohibiting private arbitration companies from
administering consumer arbitrations for parties in which they have financial interest); id.
§ 1281.96 (requiring disclosures by private arbitration companies administering consumer
arbitrations); id. § 1284.3 (regulating fees charged in consumer arbitrations).
9. Uniform Arbitration Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7A-1 to 32 (Michie Supp. 2003)
[hereinafter RUAA].
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-l(b)(4).
11. Id. § 44-7A-5.
12. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
13. The question presented in the cert petition was "[w]hether the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., prohibits class-action procedures from being superimposed onto an
arbitration agreement that does not provide for class-action arbitration." Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003) (No. 02-634).
14. See Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2408; see also infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
15. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2409-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
16. So far, RUAA has been enacted by eight states and introduced in the legislatures of
eleven more. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few FactsAbout the Uniform ArbitrationAct
(2000), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last
visited Oct. 2, 2003).
17. For the leading exceptions to this statement, see 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW §§ 10:1-10: 147 (1994 & Supp. 1999); STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 26-43 (2001); Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration
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particular (and distinctive) viewpoint on FAA preemption without considering the
differing viewpoints of other commentators. Taking as a given the existing
Supreme Court case law, and relying on the perspectives of multiple academic
commentators, this Article seeks to develop an overall framework for analyzing
FAA preemption cases. The framework is not conclusive but instead highlights
areas of uncertainty for future legal development. As part of the framework, the
Article identifies and categorizes various theories of FAA preemption and then
examines how selected second generation preemption cases likely would be
decided under each of those theories. Not only might this approach aid courts in
deciding those cases, but it also will be useful in evaluating, after the fact, what
theories courts seem to be using in their decisions.
Part I provides a brief overview of general principles of federal preemption,
which set the context in which courts decide cases of FAA preemption. 8 Part II
describes the Supreme Court's FAA preemption cases.' The leading case, of
course, is Southland, which is examined in detail. Part II then discusses the Court's
cases applying and reaffirming Southland and concludes with its cases considering
how the parties' choice of governing law affects FAA preemption. Taking current
Supreme Court jurisprudence as given, Part III sets out a four-step framework for
analyzing FAA preemption. 20 Among other things, the framework identifies and
categorizes a number of alternative theories suggested by commentators for
resolving second generation FAA preemption cases. Finally, Part IV applies these
alternative theories to several cases presenting unresolved preemption issues
(including Bazzle) and explains the likely outcome under each theory.2 1
I. GENERAL PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court decides FAA preemption cases in the context of its
broader preemption jurisprudence. This22Part provides a brief summary of those
general principles of federal preemption.

Federalism:A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REv. 175 (2002); Stephen
L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 67; Stephen J. Ware, 'Opt-In' for Judicial
Review of Errorsof Law Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
263, 269 (1997) [hereinafter Ware, 'Opt-In'forJudicialReview]; Stephen J. Ware, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration:Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment and Federal
Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 554 (1994) [hereinafter Ware, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration]; Alan Scott Rau, Does State Arbitration Law Matter At All? Part
II: A Continuing Role for State Law, ADR CURRENTS, Dec. 1998, at 20, 20. For a

comparison of how these authorities deal with second generation cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 173-99.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 22-39.

19. See infra text accompanying notes 40-113.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 114-99.

21. See infra text accompanying notes 200-39.
22. For more detailed summaries, see CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY
(2004) (forthcoming) (on file with author); KENmH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF
PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE (1991). For critical
analyses of current preemption doctrine, see, for example, Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the
Law of Preemption, 88 GEo. L.J. 2085 (2000); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv.
225 (2000).
CLAUSE
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"[P]re-emption doctrine is derived" from the Supremacy Clause, 23 which
makes federal law the "supreme Law of the Land. 24 Whether a particular federal
statute preempts a particular state law, thus rendering the state law unenforceable,
depends on congressional intent.25 To aid it in determining congressional intent, the
Supreme Court takes what has been called a "categorical" approach to preemption
issues. 26 The first category is express preemption-when Congress, in the terms of
27
a statute, indicates the extent to which state law is preempted. According to the
through explicit
known
intent
its
Supreme Court, "when Congress has made
statutory language, the courts' task is any easy one," an assertion belied by the
29
2
Court's own cases. The FAA does not contain an express preemption clause.
The other two categories of preemption analysis are different types of implied
preemption: cases in which federal law preempts state law even though Congress
has not expressly so stated in the statute itself.30 One is implied field preemption:
when (either because of pervasive federal regulation or a dominant federal interest)
3
federal legislation so occupies a field that state law is completely displaced. ' The
other is implied conflict preemption: state law is preempted when it "actually
conflicts" with federal law. 32Thus, state law is preempted when it is impossible for
a party to comply with both federal law and state law ("impossibility
preemption") 33 and when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment

23. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
24. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.

25. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963) ('The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.").
26. Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and
InterpretativeIssues, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1149, 1151 (1998).
27. An often-quoted statement of the Court's preemption categories can be found in
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 529-31 (1992) (holding
that the amended Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempts state law in part).
29. Caleb Nelson argues that there is little difference in substance between section 2 of
the FAA and an express preemption provision. According to Nelson, section 2
can readily be recast in the form of an express preemption clause; for
most purposes, it is identical to a provision that "no state or local
government shall adopt or enforce any law or policy that makes a
written arbitration agreement in a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce invalid, revocable, or unenforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."
Nelson, supra note 22, at 299.
30. In fact, the Court's three categories mix apples with oranges. While express
preemption is a distinct category from implied conflict preemption and implied field
preemption, express preemption clauses can preempt conflicting state laws or can preempt
the entire field. See S. Candice Hoke, PreemptionPathologiesand Civic Republican Virtues,
71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 735-36, fig. 1 (1991). On this view, there should be at least four
preemption categories, rather than three.
31. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
32. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
33. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). In
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), the Supreme Court
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and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" ("obstacle
preemption").34 Most implied preemption cases involve obstacle preemption. True
impossibility preemption is rare, 35 and in recent years the Su3 reme Court has
become much less likely to find field preemption than in the past.

p

Finally, in subject matter areas "traditionally occupied" by the states, the Court
applies a presumption against preemption: it presumes "that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 37 The "presumption against
preemption" is just that-a presumption, which can be overcome by making the
necessary showing.3 8 Contract law certainly would be an area that states have
"traditionally occupied,, 39 so that the presumption against preemption should
apply.
II. LEADING FAA

PREEMPTION CASES

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that both pre-dispute and
post-dispute arbitration agreements 4° within its scope "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. 4 1 Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court held in
Southland Corp. v. Keating that section 2 applies in state court and preempts
conflicting state laws.4 2 This Part first describes the Southland case, and then
discusses subsequent Supreme Court cases applying and reaffirming Southland.

gave as an example of impossibility preemption a case in which state law forbids banks to
sell insurance and federal law requires them to do so. Id.
34. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Although this language from Hines
regularly is quoted as the standard for obstacle preemption, the case itself appears to involve
field preemption. See STARR ET AL., supra note 22, at 27; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTrUnTONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoictEs 292 (1997). But see Jack Goldsmith,
Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 175, 187-88 (arguing that Hines

is an obstacle preemption case).
35. Nelson, supra note 22, at 228 (describing the test for impossibility preemption as
"vanishingly narrow").
36. Goldsmith, supra note 34, at 213 (discussing "Court's attenuated use of field
preemption in general in recent years"); Nelson, supra note 22, at 227 ("The Court has
grown increasingly hesitant to read implicit field preemption clauses into federal statutes.").
37. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
38. Indeed, one commentator argues that, based on how the Court actually decides
preemption cases, the presumption against preemption actually is a presumption in favor of
preemption. See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.
CAR. L. REv. 967, 971 (2002).
39. It falls within the state police power, and is not an area where "there has been a
history of significant federal presence." United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 1108 (2000)
(stating that there is no presumption against preemption in the field of "national and
international maritime commerce" because "Congress has legislated in the field from the
earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory
scheme").
40. Post-dispute arbitration agreements are also called submission agreements. The
ongoing controversies over consumer and employment arbitration involve only pre-dispute,
and not post-dispute, arbitration agreements.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
42. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
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Finally, it examines the effect of choice-of-law clauses on FAA preemption as a
possible way for parties to contract around Southland.
A. Southland Corp. v. Keating
The Supreme Court first held that the FAA applies in state court and preempts
conflicting state laws in Southland Corp. v. Keating.43 Southland Corporation, the
franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores, was sued by a class of its franchisees in
California state court."a The franchisees asserted a variety of claims, including a
claim that Southland had violated the disclosure requirements of the California
Franchise Investment Law ("FIL"),45 a law enacted to protect franchisees from
unfair practices by franchisors. 46 Southland moved to compel arbitration of all the
claims based on an arbitration clause in the franchise agreement. The trial court
granted the motion to compel except as to the FIL claim. The court of appeal
reversed as to that claim and ordered it to arbitration.47 The California Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeal, holding that (1) the FIL claim was not subject to
arbitration because the arbitration clause was an invalid "condition, stipulation or
provision purporting... to waive compliance with any provision of this law"; and
(2) the FAA did not preempt the California antiwaiver provision.48
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court,
holding that the FAA applied in state court and preempted the California antiwaiver provision as applied to arbitration clauses. 49 The Court began by identifying

43. Id.
44. A number of individual franchisees also filed actions, which were consolidated with
the class action. Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 484 n.1 (Ct. App. 1980).
45. Id. at 485; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977 & Supp. 2003).
46. Some commentators are skeptical of the effects of franchisee protection statutes.
See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contractand JurisdictionalFreedom, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 339 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) ("[S]tate laws
may benefit local franchisees at the expense of national franchisors or consumers."); James
A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchisee Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON.
101, 115-16 (1991). For an empirical analysis of the use of arbitration clauses in franchise
contracts, including consideration of franchisee protection laws like the California FIL, see
Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration:
An Application to FranchiseContracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003).
47. Keating, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 493-95. The court of appeal also found "no
insurmountable obstacle" to having the arbitration proceed on a classwide basis, and directed
the trial court on remand to determine whether classwide arbitration was appropriate. Id. at
492.
48. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198, 1203-04 (Cal. 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512).
The California Supreme Court modified the ruling of the court of appeal as to classwide
arbitration, determining that classwide arbitration of the rest of the franchisees' claims was
permissible, but remanding to the trial court to determine whether classwide arbitration was
appropriate in this case. Id. at 1209.
49. The Court refused to consider whether the FAA also preempted the state court order
that arbitration proceed on a classwide basis. According to the Court, it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the matter, because Southland opposed classwide arbitration only on state law, not
federal law, grounds in the California courts, and because the California Supreme Court did
not rule on the federal issue asserted by Southland. Southland, 465 U.S. at 8-9 nn.3-4. Jean
Stemlight reports that the case then proceeded to arbitration on a classwide basis, with the
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a "national policy favoring arbitration" in the FAA.5° It found "nothing in the Act
indicating that the broad principle of enforceability [in section 2 of the Act] is
subject to any additional limitations under state law.",51 The Court also relied on the
legislative history of the Act. stating famously that "[alithough the legislative
history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in
mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the
federal courts." 52 In a footnote, the Court made clear that only section 2 of the FAA
applies in state courts; 53 sections 3 and 4, which set out procedures for enforcing
arbitration agreements, by their terms apply only in federal court.54 In sum, the
majority concluded: "In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut
the enforceability of arbitration agreements." 55 Accordingly, the FAA preempted
the California antiwaiver provision as applied to arbitration clauses. The franchisee
had to arbitrate its FIL claim.
In dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's analysis of the FAA's
legislative history. The majority's "exercise in judicial revisionism," according to
Justice O'Connor, "is unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and, in light
of the FAA's antecedents and the intervening contraction of federal power,
inexplicable., 56 She concluded, as have most-but not all-scholars to consider the
issue since Southland (some quite harshly),57 that the unambiguous legislative
trial court judge playing a significant role in the proceedings, and ultimately settled after the
arbitrators issued findings of fact. Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 41
nn. 149-50 (2000).
50. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (noting a "national policy favoring arbitration"); Mitsubishi Motors

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985) (finding an "emphatic
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution").
51. Southland, 465 U.S. at 11.
52. Id. at 12.
53. See id. at 16 n.10.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (authorizing a stay pending arbitration in action "brought in any
of the courts of the United States"); id. § 4 (permitting order to compel arbitration in "any
United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under
Title 28").
55. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
56. Id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62
BROOK. L. REv. 1459, 1469 n.33 (1996) ("he Southland decision is remarkable for its
preemption holding that blatantly ignores legislative intent."); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 331, 380 ("[T]he opinion of the
Court was an extraordinarily disingenuous manipulation of the history of the 1925 Act.");
Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 17, at 183 (stating that the FAA "was meant to extend only
to the validation and enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal courts is clear from
every direction" (emphasis in original)); 1 MACNEIL Er AL., supra note 17, § 10.2, at 10:5
(describing majority opinion in Southland as setting out a "painfully misleading history of
the FAA"); David S. Schwartz, CorrectingFederalismMistakes in Statutory Interpretation:
The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2004), http://www.roscoepound.org/new/schwartz.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,
2004). See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 117 (1992) (examining legislative history and

concluding that it unambiguously shows that "the proposed [FAA] was intended to apply
only in federal courts" and that "[i]t was never intended to create substantive federal
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history of the FAA "establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the
FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts. 5 8 As such, it did not
preempt the California law in this state court case.
Justice Stevens also dissented, relying on the language in section 2 that permits
arbitration agreements to be revoked upon "such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract., 59 One common law ground for
revocation is that a contract is void as against public policy. The California antiwaiver provision was just such a public policy ground for revocation, Justice
Stevens argued, and thus should have been saved from preemption. 6° Reinforcing
this conclusion, according to Justice Stevens, was the presumption against
preemption in areas traditionally occupied by the states (contract law presumably
being such an area). 61 The majority did not discuss whether or how the presumption
against preemption applied to the FAA.
B. Post-SouthlandCases
After Southland, the Supreme Court next considered FAA preemption in Perry
62
V. Thomas. In Perry, the Court held that section 2 of the FAA preempted a

provision of the California Labor Code that permitted court actions to collect wages
"without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate." 63 The main
issue in Perry was whether the preemption issue already had been decided in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware.64 The Supreme Court ruled

otherwise, holding that Ware resolved only the preemptive effect of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act6 5 and not the Federal Arbitration Act. 66 Now considering
the FAA preemption issue, the Court held that the California statute, which in the
Court's words required "that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving
wage disputes," was "in unmistakable conflict" with section 2 of the FAA and thus
was preempted.67 In a footnote, the Court addressed the availability of general
contract law defenses, such as unconscionability, in a challenge to an arbitration
agreement. Such a state law defense, "whether of legislative or judicial origin, is
applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability,
regulatory law superseding state law under the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution"). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the
Legislative History of the FederalArbitrationAct, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 101, 107 (2002)
(concluding that "construing the Act as applicable in state court is more consistent with the
legislative history-that is, it leaves fewer ambiguities unexplained-than the Macneil
interpretation").
58. Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 9 U.S.C. §
2 (2000)).

60. Id. at 20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In support of his
argument, Justice Stevens explained that "the California Legislature has declared all

conditions purporting to waive compliance with the protections of the Franchise Investment
Law, including but not limited to arbitration provisions, void as a matter of public policy."
Id.

61. Id. at 18-19.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

482 U.S. 483 (1987).
CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1989 & Supp. 2003).
414 U.S. 117 (1973).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000).
Perry,482 U.S. at 491.

67. Id.
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and enforceability of contracts generally." 68 A court may not, however, "rely on the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this6 9would enable the court to effect
what we hold today the state legislature cannot.',
Although the primary issue in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson70 was the
scope of the FAA, the Court also addressed the Act's preemptive effect. Before
reaching the scope issue, the Court set out three background points. First, "the basic
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce
agreements to arbitrate.' Second, in enacting the FAA, Congress relied at least in
part on its power to regulate interstate commerce. 72 Third, the Court had held in
Southland that the FAA applies in state court and, thus, "state courts cannot apply
state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements." 73 After setting out that legal
background, the Court declined the request of the Dobsons and twenty state
attorneys general that it overrule Southland.74 It did not reexamine the merits of the
Southland decision. Instead, for a number reasons (the Court had considered the
same arguments in Southland; no subsequent cases had eroded Southland's
holding; parties had relied on Southland by entering arbitration agreements; and
Congress had enacted laws since Southland that expanded the enforceability of
arbitration agreements), the Court found "it inappropriate to reconsider what is by
now well-established law."'75 After reaffirming Southland, the Court then construed
the scope of the FAA as extending to the full reach of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause.76 Because the parties agreed that the transaction involved in the
case was within the scope of the commerce power, the FAA applied and preempted
an Alabama law that precluded specific enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. 77
Justice O'Connor, who had dissented in Southland, reiterated her views from
that case but decided, for "considerations of stare decisis," to go along with the
majority. 78 Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, arguing that Southland was
wrongly decided and should be overruled.79 Justice Scalia wrote separately to add

68. Id. at 492 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
69. Id.
70. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
71. Id. at 270.
72. Id. at 271; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
405 (1967) (concluding that FAA "is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal
foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty"') (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
73. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 273-77.
77. The Alabama statute included pre-dispute arbitration agreements in a listing of
several other types of contracts for which specific performance was not available. See ALA.
CODE § 8-1-41 (1975).

78. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 296 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the necessity of 'preserv[ing]
state autonomy in state courts' is sufficient justification for overruling Southland) (quoting
id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original)). In his dissent, Justice Thomas
cited the "clear statement" rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), which demands
even more clarity from Congress than the presumption against preemption. Allied-Bruce,

2004]

FAA PREEMPTION

that he would not dissent in the future from FAA preemption cases, but would vote
to overrule Southland should four other Justices do so as well.80
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,8 1 the Court held preempted a
different type of state statute than those it had faced previously. The Montana
statute at issue in Doctor's Associates required conspicuous notice on the front
page of a contract that the contract included an arbitration clause. "Unless such
notice is displayed thereon," the law provided, "the contract may not be subject to
arbitration.", ; When the Montana courts refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement that did not meet the statutory requirements, the Supreme Court had
little difficulty in holding the statute preempted. According to the Court, the
Montana statute "directly conflicts with § 2 of the FAA because the State's law
conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a
special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally."8 3 The Court
emphasized that the statutory provision "would not enforce the arbitration clause in
the contract between [Doctor's Associates] and Casarotto," but rather "would
invalidate the clause." 84 By "plac[ing] arbitration agreements in a class apart from
'any contract'"-unlike generally applicable contract law defenses such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability-the provision "singularly limits their validity" and
thus is preempted. 5
The most recent case in which the Court considered FAA preemption is Green
FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle.86 In Bazzle, the Court granted review to decide whether
513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see 1 LAURENCE H.
CONSTTUTIONAL LAW

TRIBE,

AMERICAN

§ 6-28, at 1176 n.21 (3d ed. 2000).

80. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) (amended 1997).
83. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
84. Id. at 688.
85. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case occurred
prior to the Supreme Court's ultimate decision. Concurring in the original decision of the
Montana Supreme Court (see Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), vacated
sub. nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995)), Justice Terry N.
Trieweiler wrote a lengthy opinion criticizing the federal courts for enforcing pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. Casarotto,886 P.2d at 939-41. Justice Trieweiler's opinion gives a good
sense of the frustration some state court judges feel as a result of Southland and FAA
preemption.
86. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). The Court also touched on FAA preemption briefly in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). The issue in Circuit City was
whether the employment exclusion of the FAA (for "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce," 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)) excluded all employment contracts from the scope of the
FAA or simply employment contracts of transportation workers. In the course of adopting the
latter interpretation, Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119, the Court dismissed the concern raised by
various amici about the federalism implications of its holding. Amici argued that if the
employment exclusion were construed narrowly, the FAA would more broadly preempt state
laws restricting the enforceability of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. The Court
responded that the criticism was more properly directed at Southland and its holding that the
FAA applies in state court and preempts "state antiarbitration laws." Id. at 122. But,
according to the Court:
The question of Southland's continuing vitality was given explicit
consideration in Allied-Bruce, and the Court declined to overrule it. The
decision, furthermore, is not directly implicated in this case, which
concerns the application of the FAA in a federal, rather than in a state,
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a state court could order arbitration on a classwide basis (i.e., with the plaintiff
acting on behalf of all similarly situated parties in a combined arbitration
proceeding, like a class action in court). 87 The South Carolina Supreme Court had
held that a court could order classwide arbitration, at least when the parties'
arbitration agreement was silent on the question.88 Green Tree argued that the
parties' arbitration agreement precluded classwide arbitration and that a state rule
overriding that agreement was preempted by the FAA.
In the end, the plurality opinion did not address the preemption issue, holding
instead that the arbitrator, rather than the South Carolina court, should have
determined whether the contract precluded classwide arbitration. 89 Justice Thomas
adhered to his prior view that the FAA does not apply in state court and thus would
have affirmed the South Carolina court's decision. 9° However, three dissenting
Justices, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the contract did
clearly preclude classwide arbitration and so went on to discuss the preemption
issue.
The Chief Justice's opinion identified the purpose (or purposes) of the Federal
Arbitration Act as follows: "The 'central purpose' of the FAA is 'to ensure that
private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.' In other
words, Congress sought simply to 'place such agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts."' 91 Here, the parties provided in their arbitration agreement that
classwide arbitration was not permitted, according to the dissent, by requiring the
parties to each individual contract (rather than the entire class of contracts) to agree
to a particular arbitrator. By certifying a classwide arbitration proceeding, "the
Supreme Court of South Carolina imposed a regime that was contrary to the
court. The Court should not chip away at Southland by indirection,
especially by the adoption of the variable statutory interpretation theory
advanced by the respondent in the instant case. Not all of the Justices
who join today's holding agreed with Allied-Bruce, but it would be
incongruous to adopt, as we did in Allied-Bruce, a conventional reading
of the FAA's coverage in § 2 in order to implement proarbitration
policies and an unconventional reading of the reach of § 1 in order to
undo the same coverage. In Allied-Bruce the Court noted that Congress
had not moved to overturn Southland, and we now note that it has not
done so in response to Allied-Bruce itself.
Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
87. See supra text accompanying note 13.
88. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 359 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 123 S.
Ct. 2402 (2003).
89. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2408. The outcome of the case actually was more complicated,
with the Justices issuing four different opinions, none of which commanded a majority of the
Court. Four Justices voted to vacate the lower court decision and to have the arbitrator
determine whether the contract precluded classwide arbitration. Id. at 2407-08. Three
Justices would have reversed the lower court outright on grounds of FAA preemption. Id. at
2410-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Two Justices would have affirmed, each for different
reasons. Id. at 2411 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2408 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part). One of those Justices, Justice Stevens, joined the plurality
opinion only so that there would be a controlling judgment of the Court. Id. at 2408-09
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 2411 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2410 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1995) and Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) respectively).
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92
express agreement of the parties as to how the arbitrator would be chosen."
Because the South Carolina court did not enforce the parties' arbitration agreement
according to its terms, the dissent would have held that the decision was contrary to
the FAA and thus preempted.93

C. Choice-of-Law Clauses and FAA Preemption
The Supreme Court has addressed FAA preemption in two additional casesVolt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
Universiy9 4 and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.Y5 -which are
discussed separately because the Court considered an important factual variation:
the parties had included in their contracts not only an arbitration clause, but also a
choice-of-law clause specifying that a particular state's law governed the contract.
The issue in Volt and Mastrobuono was what effect the choice-of-law clause had
on FAA preemption.
In Volt, the case came to the Supreme Court from the California state courts,
which had construed the choice-of-law clause as referring not only to substantive
contract law but also to California arbitration law.96 Thus, according to the
California courts, the parties in Volt had agreed that the provisions of California
arbitration law would govern any arbitration proceeding under the contract. 97 One
such provision was § 1281.2(c) of the California Civil Procedure Code, which
permits a court to stay an arbitration proceeding while it resolves a related issue in
a case between a party to the arbitration agreement and a third party.98 Relying on
what it found to be the parties' agreement (via the choice-of-law clause), the trial
court had stayed the construction arbitration between Volt (an electrical contractor)
and Stanford pending resolution of related claims Stanford had against two other
construction companies.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Initially, the Court deferred to the
California courts' interpretation of the choice-of-law clause. 99 It concluded that
"[i]nterpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules governing the
conduct of arbitration-rules which are manifestly designed to encourage resort to
the arbitral process-simply does not offend the rule of liberal construction" of
arbitration agreements under the FAA. 1° Because the parties had "incorporated the
California rules of arbitration into their arbitration agreement," 10' those rules were
not preempted by the FAA. The Court explained that the FAA did not contain an
02
express preemption clause and did not preempt the entire field of arbitration law.'
Nor was state law an obstacle to Congress's purpose in enacting the FAA, which
was to "require[] courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like

92. Id. at 2411 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2409, 2411 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
94. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
95. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
96. 489 U.S. at 472.
97. Id. at 479.
98. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).
99. 489 U.S. at 474-75.
100. Id. at 476.
101. Id. at 474.
102. Id. at 477.
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other contracts, in accordance with their terms."' 10 3 Because the "parties have
agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the
terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the
result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go
forward.-

Although the Court did not say so in Volt, § 1281.2(c) likely would have been
preempted by the FAA in the absence of the choice-of-law clause. 0 5 (Indeed, the
entire rationale of Volt would have been unnecessary otherwise.) As a result, Volt
opened a potentially significant loophole to the Southland decision. ' 6 After the
decision in Volt, for any contract containing a standard choice-of-law clause, a state
court could construe the clause as an agreement to follow the state arbitration law,
and continue to enforce at least some state laws that otherwise would be preempted
under Southland.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 107 tried to close that loophole
(to some degree). In Mastrobuono, a securities brokerage sought to vacate an
arbitration award of punitive damages in favor of a former customer.10 8 The
brokerage argued that the arbitrators lacked the authority to award punitive
damages because New York law--to which the parties had allegedly agreed by use
of a general choice-of-law clause-precluded arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages. 09
The Supreme Court rejected the argument and upheld the arbitration award.' 10
The Court began by stating that "our decisions in Allied-Bruce, Southland, and
Perry make clear that if contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive
damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement
will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise
exclude such claims from arbitration.""' In other words, in the absence of the
choice-of-law clause, the FAA would preempt the New York rule on punitive

103. Id. at 478.
104. Id. at 479.
105. See Warren-Guthrie v. Health Net, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 266 (Ct. App. 2000)
(holding § 1281.2(c) preempted by the FAA); Liddington v. Energy Group, 238 Cal. Rptr.
202, 207 (Ct. App. 1997) (same). But see Chronus Invs., Inc. v. Concierge Servs., LLC, 133
Cal. Rptr. 2d 384, 392 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating Warren-Guthrie and Energy Group "are
wrongly decided"), review granted, 72 P.3d 1166 (Cal. 2003). In Doctor'sAssociates, Inc.,
the Supreme Court distinguished Volt on the ground that "[t]he state rule examined in Volt
determined only the efficient order of proceedings; it did not affect the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement itself." Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
The better distinction, of course, is that in Volt the parties had agreed (at least according to
the California courts) that the rule at issue would apply to their arbitration proceeding. In
Doctor's Associates, there was no such agreement. The subject of the state law would,
however, be relevant to the reasonableness of interpreting a choice-of-law clause as
incorporating state arbitration law.

106. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 947 n.74 (1999) (describing Volt as
creating a "narrow exception to the broad preemption of Southland').
107. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).

108. Id. at 54.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 64.
111. Id. at 58 (emphasis in original).
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damages. But unlike Volt, here the Supreme Court concluded that the parties did
not contract for application of New York arbitration law. Instead, the choice-of-law
clause was an agreement that "New York's substantive rights and obligations, and
not the State's allocation of power between alternative tribunals," governed the
parties' relationship." 2 The Court distinguished Volt as a case in which it deferred
to the California courts' contract interpretation, whereas here it was reviewing a
federal court interpretation to which it owed no deference." 3 Construing the
choice-of-law clause on its own, the Supreme Court held that it did not constitute
an agreement to the New York punitive damages rule.
III. FAA PREEMPTION:

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Given the Supreme Court's cases to date, how should one analyze whether the
FAA preempts a particular state law? 14 The starting point is that preemption under
the FAA is a form of conflict preemption, with state laws preempted when they
conflict with the dictate of § 2 that arbitration agreements be "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable." ' 5 Then the question is: when do state arbitration laws conflict
with the FAA? The focus here is on FAA preemption issues as they arise in state
courts, the issue addressed by the Supreme Court in virtually all of its FAA
preemption cases. In some respects, the analysis may differ in federal courts (as
noted when appropriate).
This Part sets out a basic framework for analyzing FAA preemption, taking as
given the Supreme Court's cases to date. The analytical framework consists of four
steps:
1. Does the state law apply to contracts generally or does it
"single out" arbitration agreements for different treatment than
other contracts? If the law applies to contracts generally, it is not

112. Id. at 60.
113. Id. at 60 n.4.

114. I do not consider here federal statutes, such as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000), which save otherwise preempted state laws from preemption. A
number of courts have held that state laws restricting arbitration of insurance disputes are
saved from preemption by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. E.g., Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375,
381 (Colo. 2003); Friday v. Trinity Universal, 939 P.2d 869, 872 (Kan. 1997). But see Little
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 538, 539 (Vt. 1997). I also assume that the arbitration clause is
in a "maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," 9
U.S.C. § 2-in other words, that the FAA applies. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123
S. Ct. 2037 (2003); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
115.9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see, e.g., Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78 (describing issue as

whether the California law "would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA").
Academic commentators are divided, however, on whether FAA preemption is a form of
impossibility preemption or whether it is a form of obstacle preemption. Compare 1 TRIBE,
supra note 79, § 6-29, at 1179-80 (listing Southland as case in which "compliance with both
[state law and federal law] is a literal impossibility") with Nelson, supra note 22, at 228 n.15
(The Supreme Court "made clear that even if one sovereign's law purports to give people a
right to engage in conduct that the other sovereign's law purports to prohibit, the 'physical
impossibility' test is not satisfied; a person could comply with both state and federal law
simply by refraining from the conduct.").
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preempted. If it singles out arbitration agreements for different
treatment than other contracts, continue with the next step.
2. Have the parties expressly contracted for application of the
state law iv die arbitration proceeding? if so, the iaw is not
preempted. If not, continue with the next step.
3. Does the state law invalidate the parties' arbitration
agreement, in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally
(i.e., does application of the state law result in the parties going
to court even though they have agreed to arbitrate their dispute)?
If so, the law is preempted. If not, continue with the final step.
4. Evaluate the state law under one of the following alternative
preemption theories (described below): the Keystone Theory; the
RUAA Theory; the Anti-FAA Theory; the Pro-Contract Theory;
or the FAA Exclusivity Theory.
The rest of this Part discusses each of the steps in more detail.
A. Step One: Does the State Law Apply to ContractsGenerally or Does it Single
Out ArbitrationAgreements for Different Treatment?
This step comes from the saving clause in § 2 of the FAA, which makes
agreements to arbitrate "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ' l 6 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state laws which single out arbitration
agreements are subject to preemption by the FAA, while stating that general
contract law defenses are not. 1 7 As the Court explained in Allied-Bruce:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under
general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration
clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). What States may not
do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms
(price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration
clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of
policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal118"footing," directly
contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent.
Although this distinction seems straightforward, uncertainty remains in the lower
courts on at least two issues.
First, how general must the state law be to avoid preemption? Certainly state
laws that apply only to arbitration agreements do not qualify. Conversely, general9
contract law defenses usually are okay, subject to the caveat discussed below."

116.9 U.S.C. § 2.
117. E.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
118. 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 134-38.
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The uncertainty is how to deal with state laws that apply to arbitration clauses and
some other type of contract clause, but not to contracts generally. The most
commonly litigated example involves state statutes that preclude the parties from
contracting for an out-of-state dispute resolution forum, effectively requiring that
any arbitration proceeding or court case be brought in the state. 120 Such statutes
apply to only two types of contract clauses, not to all contracts. But they do not
single out arbitration clauses. Lower courts are2 1 split on whether such statutes fall
under the saving clause and avoid preemption.'
In my view, the courts should hold that state laws that apply to arbitration
clauses and some other type of contract clause are preempted. In other words, they
should reject the interpretation of the FAA as preempting only state laws that
"single out" arbitration clauses. 122 The argument is threefold. First, that
interpretation conflicts with the plain language of § 2, which permits invalidation
of arbitration agreements only on "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."' 23 State laws applicable to arbitration clauses and
some other types of contracts, but not all contracts, are not "grounds ... for the
revocation of any contract."'' 24 Instead, the plain meaning of the saving clause in
§ 2 is to preserve only such general contract defenses as lack of assent, fraud,
duress, and so forth, that truly can apply to any contract. The "singling out"
phrasing comes from language in Supreme Court cases, 25 not from the
26 statute
itself, and is contradicted by other language in the Court's own opinions.1
Second, the "singling out" interpretation of the FAA is inconsistent with
Southland. The California statute held preempted in Southland did not "single out"
arbitration clauses; instead, it was a broad anti-waiver provision of the sort
common in franchisee
protection statutes 27 and other regulatory

120. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
121. Compare Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Mont. 1998)
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1633 (2003) (holding statute not preempted) with Bradley v. Harris
Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding statute preempted). See also
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 15-17 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., specially
concurring) (contending that the Montana requirement that waivers of state constitutional
rights be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent is not preempted by FAA because it does not
single out arbitration agreements) (citing Keystone, 971 P.2d at 1244-45); Patterson v. Piano
Craft Guild Assocs., No. 01-4376, 2002 WL 31931580, at *5-7 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002)
(holding Massachusetts law invalidating clauses that waive right to jury trial preempted even
though not limited to arbitration clauses).
122. See also Rau, supra note 17, at 20. For other views, see Jean R. Sternlinght, The
Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U. SAN
FRAN. L. REv. 17 (2003); Stephen J. Ware, ContractualArbitration,Mandatory Arbitration
and State Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 39 (2003); David

Schwartz, State Judges as Guardiansof Federalism:Resisting the FederalArbitrationAct's
Encroachmenton State Law, at http://www.roscoepound.org/new/updates/schwartz.pdf (last
visited Oct. 2, 2003).
123. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
124. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (citing 9
U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis in original)).
125. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ("Congress
precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status ... .
126. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 118.
127. E.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 482E-6(2)(F) (1993); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/41
(1999); MIcH. COMp. LAWS § 445.1527(b) (2002); MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (1998); N.Y. GEN.
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statutes."' It provided that "[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision purporting to
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of
this law or any rule or order hereunder is void."' 129 The California Supreme Court in
Southland held that the anti-waiver provision precluded the arbitration of disputes
under the Franchise investment Law, but did not purport to limit the reach of the
statute to arbitration clauses. To the contrary, anti-waiver provisions in franchisee
protection statutes have been applied in California and elsewhere to invalidate a
wide variety of contract provisions in addition to arbitration clauses. 13° Thus, the
holding in Southland was that a state law which applies to more than just
arbitration clauses nonetheless is preempted.' 3 ' The "singling out" theory seems to
be a backdoor attempt to32have the Supreme Court overrule Southland, which it
already has refused to do.'
Finally, the "singling out" interpretation of FAA preemption would permit
states to eviscerate the FAA entirely. Under that interpretation, a state law that
invalidated all pre-dispute waivers of the right to jury trial would not be preempted
by the FAA because it did not single out arbitration clauses: it also would
invalidate jury trial waivers in court selection clauses. And yet such a state law
would make arbitration agreements wholly unenforceable in the state, because by
definition arbitration clauses provide for an arbitrator, rather than a jury, to resolve
the parties' dispute. Nothing in the FAA or the Supreme Court's interpretations of
the FAA supports such a result.' 33 In short, courts should reject the view that the
FAA preempts only state laws that single out arbitration clauses.

Bus. LAW § 687(4) (McKinney 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-16(7) (1999); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 826(C) (West 2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.100,220(2) (West 1999);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 553.76 (West 1998).

128. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (2000).
129. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1984) (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 31512 (West 1977)). The "singling out" argument does not seem to have been addressed
by the parties in Southland, although Justice Stevens, in his concurring and dissenting
opinion, stated that "the California Legislature has declared all conditions purporting to
waive compliance with the protections of the Franchise Investment Law, including but not
limited to arbitration provisions, void as a matter of public policy." Id. at 20 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority, in its response to Justice Stevens'
opinion, asserted that "the defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise
Investment Law is not a ground that exists at law or in equity 'for the revocation of any
contract' but merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions...
subject to the California Franchise Investment Law." Id. at 16 n. 11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)
(emphasis in original).
130. E.g., Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (holding anti-waiver provision invalidates choice-of-law clauses); Wimsatt v. Beverly
Hills Weight Loss Clinics Int'l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 613 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding
anti-waiver provision invalidates forum selection clauses). In addition, the anti-waiver
provision expressly precludes waiver of express statutory rights of the franchisee. See, e.g.,
MINN. R. 2860.5400(G) (2003) (applying anti-waiver provision to invalidate waivers of
numerous statutory rights of franchisee).
131. See also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 269 (holding preempted section 8-1-41 of the
Alabama Code, which precludes specific performance of agreements to arbitrate and other
contract provisions).
132. Id. at 272 ("[W]e find it inappropriate to reconsider what is by now wellestablished law.").
133. See Southland,465 U.S. at 16 n.ll.
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Second, when, if ever, do general contract law defenses, as applied, single out
arbitration clauses?134 In Perry, the Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that a court may
not "rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable."' 35 Thus, courts generally
assume that they cannot base a finding of unconscionability solely on the fact that a
contract contains an arbitration clause. But a growing number of courts have found
provisions included in an arbitration clause unconscionable (such as provisions
requiring cost-sharing, limiting remedies, shortening the statute of limitations,
restricting the availability of class relief, and so forth)' 36 and then proceeded to
invalidate the arbitration clause because it included such provisions. Lower courts
137
generally have rejected the argument that such holdings are preempted,
but the
38
issue.'
the
addressed
not
has
far
so
Court
Supreme
United States
B. Step Two: Have the PartiesContractedfor Application of the State Law to the
Arbitration Proceeding?
This step is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Volt 1 39 (as explained
in Mastrobuono 40 ). The best way to understand the decision in Volt is based on the
idea of incorporation by reference: by choosing a state's arbitration law, the parties
are making it part of their agreement, just like agreeing to arbitrate under a
particular set of institutional rules incorporates those rules into their agreement. If
the parties incorporate a state arbitration law by reference into their arbitration
agreement, that law becomes part of their agreement and thus not subject to
preemption. The fact setting of Mastrobuono illustrates the point. Under ordinary
FAA preemption principles, the NewYork law that precludes arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages would be preempted. 14 1 But nothing in the FAA
requires the parties to arbitrate claims for punitive damages. If the parties wish to

134. See Rau, supra note 17, at 21-22.
135. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
136. The ongoing litigation involving the Circuit City arbitration clause is only one
example. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding arbitration clause unconscionable); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165,
1171-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th
Cir. 2002) (same), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002). But see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no procedural unconscionability due to
opt-out provision); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.
2002) (same).
137. E.g., Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1133 (2002).
138. A clear example of a state's application of a "general" contract defense in a
manner preempted by the FAA is the Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption of a special
mutuality requirement only for arbitration clauses. Money Place, LLC v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d
714, 717 (Ark. 2002); E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436 (Ark. 2000); see 2
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 17, § 17.4.2, at 17:59. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal,
Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 537 (2002) (arguing that mutuality

requirement as applied to arbitration clauses is misguided as a policy matter).
139. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468,477 (1989).
140. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).
141. Id. at 58; see supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
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exclude punitive damages claims from arbitration, they are free so to provide in
their contract. Even though the result is the same as under the New York law, there
is nothing for the FAA to preempt: it is the parties' agreement, and not New York
law, that prevents arbitration of the punitive damages claim.
There are a variety of ways that parties can draft a contract provision that
precludes the award of punitive damages. 142 They can waive any claim for punitive
damages. They can deny the arbitrator the authority to award punitive damages.
They can do both. Such clauses are common ways to exclude punitive damages
claims from arbitration. 143 But there are other ways the parties might draft such a
provision. They could state that New York law precluding the award of punitive
damages applies to their arbitration proceeding. More generally, they could agree
that New York arbitration law governs their arbitration. Or they could agree that
New York law governs their contract. It is by no means clear that this last provision
incorporates the New York rule on punitive damages into the parties' contract, but
arguably that is what it does. Indeed, in Volt the Supreme Court took as given the
California court's interpretation of a general choice-of-law clause as incorporating
by reference California arbitration law,144
although the Court rejected such an
145
interpretation on its own in Mastrobuono.
It does not matter whether the state rule at issue or the state's arbitration law
1 46
generally is pro-arbitration, at least as to this incorporation by reference issue.
Indeed, in the illustration above, the state rule plainly is not pro-arbitration in any
reasonable sense of the word. A simple example makes the point even more clear.
Under the FAA, the parties clearly could exclude tort claims from their arbitration
agreement. Nothing in the FAA requires them to arbitrate tort claims; instead, the
FAA requires enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Kansas law
precludes arbitration of tort claims.' Application of such a law to an arbitration
agreement governed by the FAA ordinarily would be preempted by the Act.148 If,
however, the parties define the scope of their arbitration agreement as "we agree to
49
arbitrate all claims that are arbitrable under Kansas law (ignoring federal law1 ),"
the result should be the same as if they contracted expressly for tort claims not to

142. For examples, see CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
CASES AND PROBLEMS 264, prob. 4.13 (2002).
143. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695,
737-38.
144. 489 U.S. at 474-75.
145. 514 U.S. at 60.
146. It certainly may matter, however, in determining the reasonableness of interpreting
a general choice-of-law clause as incorporating by reference state arbitration law. That was
the tough issue in Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-76.
147. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c) (2001).
148. E.g., Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 829 P.2d 874, 875 (Kan. 1992).
149. The "ignoring federal law" language in the sample clause above is important
because a reference to Kansas law alone is ambiguous. Given that federal law is the supreme
law of the land in Kansas as in the other states, the phrase "Kansas law" may mean "Kansas
law as modified by applicable federal law." Under such an interpretation, a clause providing
for Kansas law to apply would not incorporate the applicable state law if state law were
preempted by the FAA. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 59 (The Volt interpretation assumes
that a choice-of-law clause "includes the caveat, 'detached from otherwise-applicable federal
law."').
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be arbitrable. It does not matter whether the state law is pro- or anti-arbitration, so
long as the parties agree to it.
The trickier issue under Volt is identifying when such an incorporation by
An easy case is when the parties expressly reference a
reference occurs.
particular state law rule in their contract. A much harder case is when the parties
include a general choice-of-law clause in their contract. In Mastrobuono, the
Supreme Court construed such a clause as only referring to state substantive
contract law, not state arbitration law.' 5 1 But as Volt indicates, interpreting such
clauses generally is up to the state courts, 152 so long as the state courts'
interpretation is not so unreasonable as itself to be preempted by the FAA.' 53
Finally, what about the default provisions of state arbitration laws, 154 which fill
gaps in an arbitration agreement? In the case of default rules to which the parties
have not expressly agreed, is there sufficient consent by the parties such that the
incorporation-by-reference rationale of Volt applies? If a state has a set of default
rules dealing with arbitration, such as the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act

150. See Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect
Upon the FederalArbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 ARIz. L.

REv. 35, 44-45 (1997).
151. 514 U.S. at 62; see Diamond, supra note 150, at 61 ("Volt thus stands for the
proposition that there is no violation of the FAA's underlying policy if an ambiguous choice
of law clause is interpreted to encompass a state's rules of arbitration procedure ...
Mastrobuono stands for the proposition that there would be a violation of the FAA's policies
if an ambiguous choice of law clause were interpreted to encompass a state's rules of
arbitration substance .... ").
152. Even after Mastrobuono, many courts, although a minority, construe general
choice-of-law clauses as including state arbitration law. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 142, at
263; see also Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal

Arbitration Act Preemption, 115 HARv. L. REV. 2250, 2260 (2002) (citing conflicting
approaches taken by federal courts). Indeed, Justice Stevens did so in Green Tree Fin. Corp.
v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2408-09 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part), as did Justice Thomas in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 123 S.

Ct. 588, 594 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. For an example of a case in which construing a general choice-of-law clause as
incorporating state arbitration law would be unreasonable, see Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Co. v. White, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353-55 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (rejecting the argument
that the general choice-of-law clause incorporated by reference an Alabama statute that
makes pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable); see also Alan Scott Rau, Does State
Arbitration Law Matter At All? Part I: FederalPreemption, ADR CURRENTS, June 1998, at
19, 20 ("Are we to suppose that the parties to this contract agreed to arbitration, while at the
same time intending to adopt a body of state law that would in all possible circumstances
make their agreement to arbitrate invalid? One who believes that is capable of believing
anything.").

154. For general discussions of default rules, see, for example, Ian Ayres, Default Rules
for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE

NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE

LAw 585, 585 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarianvs. MinoritarianDefaults, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1591
(1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default
Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 489 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette,
Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL

STUD. 535 (1990); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
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contains,1 55 then those default rules will be incorporated as a matter of law into the
parties' contract to fill any gaps. The parties are free to change the rules if they
want (which is the defining characteristic of a default rule), but if they do not do so,
their contract will contain those terms.
The legal literature is divided on the degree to which default rules can be
justified on the basis of consent by the parties. 156 In some circumstances, it seems
clear that the parties assent to incorporation of a default rule into their contract. If,
for example, the reason for the gap in the contract is that the parties knew about the
default rule and so did not bother to include a contract provision on point, it seems
fair to presume that they consented to inclusion of the default rule. In other
circumstances, however, consent is not so clear. If the reason for the gap was that
the parties did not even consider the issue addressed by the default rule, it is much
harder to infer consent to the rule. Indeed, there are a variety of possible
explanations for contractual silence, with varying degrees of consent imputed to the
parties. Clayton Gillette summarizes as follows: "[C]ontractual incompleteness,
and hence the need for defaults, results from a variety of conditions, some of which
involve explicit consent, some hypothetical
consent, and some only consent of the
' 57
crudest sort involved in failing to object."'
Under Volt, the question is whether this sort of imputed assent is sufficient to
avoid FAA preemption the same way that express assent does.' 58 Given the varying
degrees of "assent" to default rules, the answer is that it likely does not. The
Supreme Court's decision in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,1 59 dealing with ERISA
preemption, provides some support for that conclusion. In Egelhoff, the Court held
that ERISA preempted a state default ("opt-out") rule that divorce automatically

Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied ContractTerms, 73 CAL. L. REV.
261 (1985); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.597 (1990); J. Hoult Verkerke,
An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just
Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 837, 869-97 (1985). See generally Symposium on Default
Rules and ContractualConsent, 3 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993).
155. See RUAA, supra note 9, § 4.
156. Compare, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Default Principles,Legitimacy, and the Authority
of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 115, 117 (1993) ("Consent-based default principles
respect the authority of the contract, but valid consent cannot reach beyond the agreement as
needed to provide a legitimate basis for enforcing all needed default rules.") with Randy E.
Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821,
826 (1992) ("In a very real sense, such [default] terms can be and often are indirectly
consented to by parties who could have contracted around them-but did not.") and Randy
E. Barnett.... and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421, 434 (1993) ('This
act of communicating consent [i.e., a voluntary act that expresses an intention to be legally
bound] can justify the enforcement of any default rule when parties are rationally informed,
and can justify the enforcement of conventionalist default rules under many circumstances
when they are not.").
157. Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 167, 172-73 (1993).
158. State default rules may still avoid preemption by the FAA if they satisfy steps
three and four of the framework. The point here is that state default rules likely are not
wholly immune from FAA preemption analysis. Cf.Rau, supra note 17, at 22 ("[T]he courts
must still must ask whether the state's background rule will 'effectuate federal policy.').
159. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
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160
revokes designation of the former spouse as beneficiary of an insurance policy.
Had the insurance policy by its terms provided for automatic revocation upon
divorce, that provision would have been enforceable under ERISA, much as parties
can incorporate by reference state law provisions into arbitration agreements under
Volt. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that the fact that the state
law was only a default rule saved it from preemption. 61 Certainly there are
differences between ERISA preemption and FAA preemption (such as that ERISA
has an express preemption clause and the FAA does not).162 Nonetheless, the
Court's
holding cautions against adopting too broad of a notion of assent under
16 3

Volt.

C. Step Three: Does the State Law Invalidate the Parties'Agreement to Arbitrate?
The third step is whether application of the state law results in the parties'
arbitration agreement being held unenforceable, in whole or in part, conditionally
or unconditionally. This step is based on the holdings of the Supreme Court's FAA
preemption cases to date, all of which (with the possible exception of Volt) have
dealt exclusively with the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate.164 Thus, in
Allied-Bruce, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted an Alabama law
making all pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable.' 65 In Southland1 66 and
Perry, 67 the Court held that the FAA preempted state statutes precluding
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses, instead permitting the parties to go
to court to resolve those claims. In Doctor's Associates, the Court held that the
FAA preempted a Montana statute invalidating an arbitration agreement (and
permitting the parties to go to court) due to a lack of conspicuous notice of the
arbitration clause in a contract. 68 Finally, in Mastrobuono, the Court stated, albeit
in dicta, that "if contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive damages
within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement will be
enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state law would otherwise exclude
such claims from arbitration."' 169 Accordingly, if the state rule precludes the parties
from arbitrating disputes they otherwise have agreed to arbitrate, in whole or in
part, conditionally or unconditionally, the FAA preempts the state rule.

160. Id. at 143.
161. Id. at 150 ("We do not believe that the statute is saved from pre-emption simply
because it is, at least in a broad sense, a default rule.").
162. For example, "one of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers 'to
establish a uniform administrative scheme."' Id. at 148 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)). The Court concluded in Egelhoff that the possibility of
differing default rules imposes a burden on plan administrators that was precisely the sort
Congress intended to prevent. Id. at 149-50. Nothing in the Supreme Court's FAA
preemption cases suggests a similar congressional purpose to promote the uniformity of
arbitration law.
163. Id. at 146.
164. For a good categorization of the sorts of state laws the Supreme Court has held
preempted, see WARE, supra note 17, at 32-37.
165. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1995).
166. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
167. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987).
168. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
169. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995).
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One of the few unsettled questions with respect to this step in the framework
involves Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California.170 In Broughton, the
California Supreme Court held that the FAA does not preempt state rules
precluding arbitration of "public injunction" actions-actions brought by
individuals acting as "private attorneys general" seeking the sole remedy of an
injunction against future bad conduct. The court explained that its decision was not
based on any hostility to arbitration but instead on
a recognition that arbitration cannot necessarily afford all the
advantages of adjudication in the area of private attorney general
actions, that in a narrow class of such actions arbitration is
inappropriate, and that this inappropriateness does not turn on the
happenstance of whether the17rights
and remedies being adjudicated are
1
of state or federal derivation.
A pair of federal district court cases have refused to follow Broughton, holdingcorrectly-that a state rule excluding claims from arbitration because arbitration is
"inappropriate" is preempted by the FAA. 172 Broughton and its progeny exhibit the
exact same hostility to arbitration that the U.S. Supreme Court has found
objectionable in its FAA preemption cases to date. The difference between the
federal and state source of rights is not mere happenstance, but is the centerpiece of
federal preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause.
D. Step Four: If the State Law Does Not Invalidate the Parties' Arbitration
Agreement, Evaluate the Law Under One of SeveralAlternative Preemption
Theories.
The Supreme Court has not yet determined how to analyze FAA preemption of
state laws that regulate the arbitration process rather than invalidate the arbitration
agreement-what I have called "second generation" FAA preemption cases.
Commentators and lower courts have set out a number of possible theories that
might be applied to such laws. I label these theories: (1) the Keystone Theory; (2)
the RUAA Theory; (3) the Anti-FAA
Theory; (4) the Pro-Contract Theory; and (5)
73
the FAA Exclusivity Theory.1

170. 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999); see also Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d
1157, 1165 (Cal. 2003) (extending Broughton to other "public injunction" actions but
refusing to extend it to claims for restitution and disgorgement).
171. 988 P.2d at 79.
172. Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197-1200 (S.D. Cal.
2001), overruled on other grounds, Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.
2003); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2002), overruled
on other grounds, Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Thomas Manakides, Note, Arbitration of "Public Injunctions": Clash Between State
Statutory Remedies and the FederalArbitrationAct, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 433 (2003).
173. Application of these theories may differ depending on whether the case is in state
court or in federal court. The key distinction is that while the entire FAA by its terms applies
in federal court, several of these theories assume (correctly in my view) that only section 2
applies in state court. On this assumption, the preemptive scope of the FAA may be broader
in federal court than in state court. One example is the appealability of orders concerning
arbitration. In federal court, appealability issues plainly are dealt with by section 16 of the
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1. Keystone Theory

A state law is not preempted, even if it singles out arbitration, so long as the
law does not invalidate the parties' arbitration agreement. The Keystone Theory is
named after the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Keystone, Inc. v. Triad
Systems Corp.,174 in which the court held that a Montana statute requiring
arbitration to take place in Montana was not preempted because it did not "nullif[y]
either party's obligation to arbitrate their dispute."' 175 The theory can be categorized
as involving a very narrow form of obstacle preemption, with the state law standing
as an obstacle to Congress's purpose of overcoming common law barriers to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Alternatively, it might be characterized as
impossibility preemption under the broader view of impossibility. 176) The Keystone
Theory is the narrowest theory described here, as it essentially limits FAA
preemption to the sorts of state laws the Supreme Court already has held
preempted.
2. RUAA Theory
A state law that does not invalidate the parties' arbitration agreement is
preempted if the state law conflicts with terms in the arbitration agreement
addressing "the most essential dimensions of the commercial arbitration process"that is, that "go to the essence of the agreement to arbitrate and the role of the
judiciary in holding parties to those agreements."' 177 The theory is called the RUAA
Theory because it is the view of FAA preemption used by the drafters of the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA"). 178 In determining the provisions to be
included in RUAA, the drafters identified a "preemption continuum. '179 At one end
of the continuum, state laws that deal with "front-end" issues (the agreement to
arbitrate and the arbitrability of a dispute) and "back-end" issues (modification,
confirmation, and vacatur of awards) are most likely to be preempted. 80 At the
other end of the continuum, state laws that deal with "procedural" issues in the
arbitration proceeding (e.g. discovery, consolidation, and the immunity of
arbitrators from suit) are least likely to be preempted.' 8 ' In between are
"borderline" issues (such as the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages

FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 16. In state court, the resolution is not so clear. See infra text
accompanying notes 230-39. For other issues, however, the difference is not so stark. See
infra text accompanying notes 206-29.
One final note on these alternative theories: My characterization and application of each
of the theories is based on my best understanding of the theories and how they would apply.
Others (including those whose theories I am describing) may, of course, disagree.
174. 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998). Justice Trieweiler wrote the opinion for the court.
See supra note 85.

175. Id. at 1245.
176. See supra note 115.

177. Hayford, supra note 17, at 75; see also Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 17, at 21326.
178. RUAA, supra note 9.
179. Hayford, supra note 17, at 74-75.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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and provisional remedies, arbitrator disclosure
of conflicts of interest, and the right
82
to counsel in arbitration proceedings).1
Although not articulated by the RUAA drafters, a possible rationale for the
RUAA Theory might go as follows: Section 2 of the FAA, the provision that
applies in state court and preempts state law, provides that agreements to arbitrate
shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."' 83 A state law can conflict with this
provision in two ways. First, the law can make an arbitration agreement invalid,
revocable, or unenforceable, such that the parties must go to court instead of
arbitration to resolve their dispute. This describes the Supreme Court's cases to
date. 84 Second, the law can alter the terms of the parties' agreement such that the
procedure being enforced is no longer "arbitration."' 85 For example, a state law
providing that all arbitration proceedings shall be presided over by a state court
judge would be preempted under this theory, even though the parties proceeded to
"arbitration." This theory might be categorized as a form of obstacle preemption,
under which state laws are preempted when they conflict with Congress's purpose
of making arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contract terms.
3. Anti-FAA Theory
A state law that does not invalidate the parties' arbitration agreement is
preempted if it "limit[s] or obstruct[s] explicit FAA provisions or general federal
arbitration law" (such as the doctrine that arbitration agreements should be
construed in favor of finding a dispute within their scope)-in other words, if the
state law is "anti-FAA."'1 86 This theory comes from Professors Ian Macneil et al. in
their FederalArbitration Law treatise.' 87 They acknowledge that most provisions
of the FAA by their terms apply only in federal court, 8 8 but they find preemptive
force in "emanations from FAA § 2" as well as in general principles of federal
arbitration law derived from the "pro-arbitration" policy of the FAA. 189 Macneil et
al. seem to suggest that a state law is preempted when it provides for a different
rule than the FAA does (including an FAA provision that does not by its terms
apply in state court), at least when the FAA provision is "an essential aspect of any
modem arbitration statute."' 9 On this view, the Anti-FAA Theory differs from the

182. Id. at 75.

183. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
184. See supra Part II.
185. Defining "arbitration" is not an easy task, however. See DRAHOZAL, supra note
142, § 1.03; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration'sFinality
Through FunctionalAnalysis, 37 GA. L. REv. 123 (2002).
186. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 17, § 10.8.2.4, at 10:93.
187. Id. §§ 10.8.2.4, 10.8.3.

188. Id. § 10.8.2.4, at 10:91-92 ("[A]lithough the Court holds that FAA §§ 3 and 4 do
not govern in state courts, it is equally clear that FAA § 2, which does govern in state courts,
carries with it duties indistinguishable from those imposed on federal courts by FAA §§ 3
and 4.").
189. Id. § 10.8.3, at 10:99.
190. Id. (concluding that state courts have an obligation to appoint arbitrators if the

parties fail to do so because it is "such an essential aspect of any modem arbitration statute
that such an obligation almost certainly follows from FAA § 2-if not directly from § 5
itself'); see also id. § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97 ("One thing remains clear, however: state law may
not contravene FAA provisions. Thus, for example, a state court vacating an award on
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RUAA Theory because the Anti-FAA Theory focuses on what is essential to a
modem arbitration law rather than on the essential aspects of the parties' obligation
to arbitrate. This theory might be characterized as a form of obstacle preemption
based on Congress's purpose of establishing a national policy in favor of
arbitration. A variation on this theory would require state laws to be less favorable
than, rather than simply different from, the FAA in order to be preempted.
4. Pro-Contract Theory
A state law that does not invalidate the parties' arbitration agreement is
preempted if it conflicts with a provision in that agreement. Professor Stephen J.
Ware is a proponent of the Pro-Contract Theory.191 He argues that the FAA takes a
"resolutely pro-contract stance"' 92 and that Section 2 of the FAA "gives the terms
of arbitration agreements the force of federal law."' 193 According to Professor Ware,
"if one can imagine an arbitration agreement that might be rendered unenforceable
by the state law then that state law is almost sure to be preempted unless it falls into
the 'general contract law' category."' 94 The Pro-Contract Theory is similar to the
RUAA Theory, only broader. Under the Pro-Contract Theory, any state law that
conflicts with a term in the parties' arbitration agreement (by singling out
arbitration) is preempted. By comparison, under the RUAA Theory, only state laws
that conflict with a term "essential" to arbitration are preempted. The preemption
theory relied on by the dissenting Justices in Bazzle most closely resembles the
Pro-Contract Theory. 95
5. FAA Exclusivity Theory
All state laws that single out arbitration are preempted. Macneil et al. identify
"strong arguments for interpreting the FAA as both exclusive and unitary and,
when it is applicable, preempting entirely all state arbitration law."' 1 96 As such,
according to Macneil et al., "the better course would be for the Supreme Court to
hold that where the FAA governs a case, state arbitration law is entirely
preempted."' 197 The argument is that the FAA occupies (or at least should be held to
occupy) the field of arbitration law. As Macneil et al. recognize, however, current

grounds other than those allowed under the FAA would be violating the principles of Perry
v. Thomas (U.S. 1987)." (footnote omitted)).
191. For a contrary view, see Schwartz, supra note 122, at 5-8 (critiquing what he calls
the "enforce as written" rule).
192. See WARE, supra note 17, at 32.

193. See Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration,supra note 17, at 554.
194. See Ware, 'Opt-in 'for JudicialReview, supra note 17, at 269.
195. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2409-11 (2003). Although
the Chief Justice's dissent in Bazzle cites extensively from Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.
of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989), that case does not support a ProContract (or any other) theory of FAA preemption. Fundamentally, Volt was a case about
when the FAA does not preempt state law. The Court held that when the parties choose state
arbitration law to govern their contract, they can avoid preemption of (at least some)
provisions of state law that otherwise might be preempted by the FAA. Relying on Volt to
define when the FAA preempts state law (rather than when it does not preempt state law)
turns Volt on its head.
196. See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 17, § 10.8.2.2, at 10:76.
197. Id. § 10.8.2.2, at 10:84.
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case law does not support this theory. 198 Indeed, the Supreme Court flatly stated in
Volt that the FAA does not "reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field
of arbitration."' 199 Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the FAA Exclusivity Theory
for purposes of comparing it with the other theories.
IV. APPLICATIONS TO SECOND GENERATION CASES

The differences between the alternative preemption theories in step four can be
illustrated by applying them to the facts of four recent cases presenting unresolved
issues of FAA preemption-all of which are "second generation" FAA preemption
cases. 200 The cases are: Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 201 in which the Ninth
Circuit held that the FAA preempted a California law requiring the arbitration
hearing to take place in-state; Bazzle v. Green Tree FinancialCorp.,22 in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court (in a holding vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court on
other grounds 2 3) rejected a preemption challenge to a court-ordered classwide
arbitration proceeding; Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. ,24 in which a federal
district court held that the FAA preempted application of the California arbitrator
ethics rules; and Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B,2 °5 in which the Maryland Court
of Appeals upheld against a preemption challenge a Maryland procedural rule
permitting immediate appeal of a court order compelling arbitration. The likely
outcomes of the cases under the alternative preemption theories (i.e., step four of
the analytical framework) are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE I
APPuCATION OF ALTERNATIVE PREEMPTION THEORIES TO
"SEcoND GENERATION" FAA PREEMPTION CASES

Bradley

Bazzle
Contract Silent

Contract Bars

Mayo

Wells

Keystone
Theory

Uphold

Uphold

Uphold

Uphold

Uphold

RUAA Theory

Uphold

Uncertain

Uncertain

Uphold*

Uphold

Anti-FAA

Uphold

Uncertain

Uncertain

Uphold*

Uncertain

Pro-Contract
Theory

Strike
Down

Uphold

Strike
Down

Strike
Down

Uphold

FAA
Exclusivity
Theory

Strike
Down

Strike
Down

Strike
Down

Strike
Down

Strike
Down

Theory

*

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Except as applied in an action to vacate the award.

Id. § 10.8.2.3, at 10:84.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.
See supra text accompanying notes 6-16.
275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001).
569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002), vacatedby 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003); see supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
768 A.2d 620 (Md. 2001).
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A. Location of ArbitrationProceedings:Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc.
In Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc.,206 the Ninth Circuit considered a
California law that invalidated any provision in a franchise agreement "restricting
venue to a forum outside this state." 20 7 As applied to an arbitration agreement, the
provision would require the arbitration proceeding to be held in California, even if
the franchise agreement provided otherwise. (If the statute invalidated the
arbitration clause altogether, then presumably it would be preempted under step
three of this analysis.) In Bradley, the Ninth Circuit held the statute to be
preempted by the FAA. 208 Most courts dealing with such statutes have held the
same. 20 9 An exception is the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Keystone,
which upheld a similar Montana statute.21 0 Note that one possible argument for
upholding the California statute is that it does not single out arbitration
agreements-it applies to court selection clauses as well. The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument in Bradley,21' and it properly is considered under step one (not step
four) of this analytical framework.
A court applying the Keystone Theory would uphold the California statute at
issue in Bradley (as the Montana Supreme Court did in Keystone itself) because
even under the statute the parties' dispute will be resolved in arbitration, not in
court. The statute would be upheld under the RUAA Theory because the location of
the proceeding does not seem to be an "essential dimension" of the arbitration
process.2 12 Under the Anti-FAA Theory, the statute likely would be upheld as well
because it does not conflict with anything in the FAA or in general arbitration
2 13
law-the FAA does not address where the arbitration proceeding is to take place.
Under the Pro-Contract Theory, however, the statute would be struck down,
assuming that the parties specified in their arbitration agreement that the arbitration
would take place out-of-state. The statute also would be preempted under the FAA
Exclusivity Theory because the FAA would preempt all state arbitration law.

206. 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001).
207. Id. at 888 n.4 (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West 2003)) ("A
provision in a franchise agreement restricting venue to a forum outside this state is void with
respect to any claim arising under or relating to a franchise agreement involving a franchise
business operating within this state.").
208. 275 F.3d at 890.
209. See, e.g., OPE Int'l LP v. Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 258 F.3d 443, 447 (5th
Cir. 2001); KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184
F.3d 42, 50-52 (1st Cir. 1999); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163 (2d
Cir. 1998); Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc. v. Bloor, 129 F.3d 851, 856 (6th Cir. 1997) (dictum).
Some, if not all of these cases, however, involve state laws that invalidate the arbitration
clause altogether when an out-of-state forum is selected, which would be preempted under
step three as noted in the text.
210. Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998).

211. 275 F.3d at 890.
212. See Hayford, supra note 17, at 75.
213. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). Section 4 provides that when a federal court compels
arbitration, "[t]he hearing and proceedings . . . shall be within the district in which the
petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). That provision
limits the authority of federal courts to compel arbitration, but does not restrict where the
parties can agree to hold the arbitration proceeding.
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B. ClasswideArbitration: Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corp.
In Bazzle v. Green Tree FinancialCorp.,214 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a court can order classwide arbitration when the parties' arbitration
agreement is silent on the matter. As discussed above, the United States Supreme
Court in Bazzle considered but did not decide whether the FAA preempts the South
Carolina rule.215 A key consideration may be whether the South Carolina rule
applies only when the parties' arbitration agreement is silent or whether it also
applies even if the agreement by its terms precludes classwide arbitration. 216 The
majority in Bazzle held that interpreting the contract provision was a question for
the arbitrator and not the court, and so did not reach the preemption issue. Three
dissenting justices, as noted previously, would have held that the contract
precluded
classwide arbitration and that the state rule was preempted by the
2 17
FAA.
Under the Keystone Theory, the South Carolina rule would not be preempted
regardless of whether the parties' arbitration clause precludes classwide arbitration.
The result under the RUAA and Anti-FAA theories is less clear. Arguably,
ordering classwide arbitration would affect an essential dimension of arbitration:
Arbitration conducted by class representatives may differ significantly from
ordinary arbitration, and proceeding on a classwide basis may restrict the parties'
choice of arbitrator (as the dissent in Bazzle argued).218 On the other hand, the
parties still have their dispute finally resolved by a private judge of their own
choosing, and the RUAA drafters classified consolidation as a "'procedural' issue"
unlikely to be preempted by the FAA. 219 Although the FAA does not expressly
address classwide arbitration or even consolidation of arbitration proceedings, the
federal courts unanimously have construed the FAA's silence as precluding
consolidation and classwide arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise. 2 ° Under

214. 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003); see also Blue Cross
of California v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting preemption
challenge to California rule permitting court to order class-wide arbitration).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
216. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2408 (2003).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
218. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. at 2409-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393 (Ct. App. 2003), review granted, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d

526 (Cal. 2003).
219. See Hayford, supra note 17, at 76 ("'[Plrocedural' issues . . . are of less
substantive importance to the nature and integrity of the arbitration process than are the
'borderline' issues positioned at the center of the preemption continuum.").
220. E.g., Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999) (no classwide
arbitration); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-77 (7th Cir. 1995) (same);
Gov't of the United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993) (no
consolidation); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 107-08 (6th Cir.
1991) (same); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990) (same);
Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir.
1989) (per curiam) (same); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145,
150 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637

(9th Cir. 1984) (same). In Pedcor Mgmt. Co. v. Nations Personnelof Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d
355 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit concluded that "[t]o the extent that the issue of
consolidation in arbitration is analogous to class arbitration, Green Tree's holding that

2004]

FAA PREEMPTION

those cases, the Anti-FAA Theory might hold the South Carolina rule preempted.
The result under the Pro-Contract Theory turns on whether the parties precluded
classwide arbitration (or agreed to have arbitration proceed on an individual basis)
in their arbitration agreement. If so, the state rule is preempted. If not, the state rule
is not preempted. Again, the South Carolina rule providing for classwide arbitration
would be preempted under the FAA exclusivity theory.
C. ArbitratorDisclosure: Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

At issue in Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.221 was the validity of ethics
standards promulgated by the California Judicial Council to govern neutral
arbitrators. 22 A central component of the ethics standards is a requirement that
neutral arbitrators make detailed disclosures of possible conflicts of interest. 223 The
disclosure requirement is reinforced by making the failure to disclose a ground for
automatically vacating the arbitration award. 224 The disclosures appear to be
broader and certainly are more detailed than those required to avoid vacatur of an
award under the FAA.225 In Mayo, a federal district court held the ethics standards
preempted as applied to securities arbitrations, in part on the ground that the ethics
standards conflicted with the parties' arbitration agreement, which provided that
the arbitration rules of the New York Stock Exchange would govern the
arbitration.226
The ethics standards would not be preempted under the Keystone theory. They
probably would not be preempted under the RUAA Theory or the Anti-FAA
Theory, except to the extent a party sought to vacate the award because of the
arbitrator's failure to disclose required information. State rules governing vacatur
of arbitration awards may well go to an essential dimension of the arbitration
process 227 and would conflict with section 10 of the FAA, which includes its own
arbitrators, not courts, decide whether an agreement provides for class arbitration would
appear to overrule Del E. Webb's holding to the contrary." Id. at 363.
221. 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2003). But see Jevne v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 542, 552 & n.8 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that ethics standards "are not preempted
by the FAA as a matter of law," but not deciding whether standards "are preempted by the
FAA as applied in this case").
222. Judicial Council of California, supra note 7. For a discussion of the history of the
California ethics rules, see Note, A New Era of Disclosure: California Enacts Arbitrator
Ethics Standards,2003 J. Disp. REsOL. 271, 280-83. An earlier preemption challenge to the

California ethics standards was dismissed on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. NASD
Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1063-65 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
223. See Judicial Council of California, supra note 7, at 7-8 (2003). For a discussion of
the history of the California ethics rules, see Keisha I. Patrick, A New Era of Disclosure:
California Judicial Council Enacts Arbitrator Ethics Standards, 2003 J. Disp. REsOL. 271,

280-83.
224. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a)(6)(A) (2003).
225. See Michael A. Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission
Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities
Arbitrations41-44 (Nov. 4, 2002), availableat http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-textperinojrep

ort.pdf. For a detailed analysis of when failure to disclose is a ground for vacating an award
under the FAA, see 3 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 17, § 28.2.
226. Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1104-05.
227. The RUAA drafters classified arbitrator disclosure as a "'borderline' issue" that

"do[es] not go to the essence of the agreement to arbitrate or the effectuation of the results of
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grounds for vacating awards. 228 To the extent parties agreed on arbitration rules that
addressed arbitrator disclosure (as in Mayo), the California ethics standards would
be preempted under the Pro-Contract Theory. Indeed, the federal court's analysis in
Mayo is very much consistent with the Pro-Contract Theory. 229 Finally, the ethics
standards also would be preempted under the FAA Exclusivity Theory.
D. Appealability of Orders Compelling Arbitration:Wells. v. Chevy Chase Bank
Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B.23 involved a Maryland law governing
when a party can appeal a court order compelling the parties to arbitrate. Some
states, like Maryland, permit a party to appeal immediately from an order
compelling arbitration.2 3' Section 16 of the FAA, by contrast, does not permit an
immediate appeal.232 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the FAA does not
preempt the Maryland rule,233 joining the "near unanimity of opinion on the matter"
in the state courts. 234 The court justified its decision on the grounds that section 16
by its terms applies only in federal court and that 235
Maryland's contrary rule does not
"undermine the goals and principles of the FAA."
The state rule at issue in Wells is different from the other state rules considered
here because it deals with the procedure in state court rather than the procedure in
arbitration. 236 Nonetheless, it should be possible to apply the alternative preemption
theories with some degree of confidence. 237 As with the other state rules, the
Maryland rule would not be preempted under the Keystone Theory and would be
preempted under the FAA Exclusivity Theory. The timing of appellate review of
orders compelling arbitration does not go to the essence of the arbitration

the process." See Hayford, supra note 17, at 75, 79 (explaining that, with respect to arbitrator
disclosure, the "Drafting Committee fashioned statutory language intended to track the
federal law"); see also Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 17, at 220-21 ("The FAA addresses,
but only obliquely, disclosure of arbitrator conflicts of interest," and so RUAA drafters
"acted boldly in addressing arbitrator disclosure.").
228. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); see 1 MACNEL ET AL., supra note 17, § 10.8.3.2, at 10:97
("One thing remains clear, however: state law may not contravene FAA provisions. Thus,
for example, a state court vacating an award on grounds other than those allowed under the
FAA would be violating the principles of Perry v. Thomas (U.S. 1987)." (footnote omitted)).
229. Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
230. 768 A.2d 620 (Md. 2001).
231. Id. at 624.
232. 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2) (2000).
233. Wells, 768 A.2d at 629.
234. See Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision of
Appellate Jurisdiction over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365, 1387
(2002).
235. Wells, 768 A.2d at 627.
236. See Rau, supra note 17, at 20-21.
237. The case is similar to Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997), in which the
Supreme Court upheld against a preemption challenge a state rule that precluded immediate
appeal of an order rejecting a qualified immunity defense in a federal civil rights action. One
difference is that in Johnson, the Supreme Court characterized the dispute as involving a
conflict between competing state interests (rather than state and federal interests): a conflict
between the state appealability rule and qualified immunity protection for state officials. Id.
at 919-20. In the arbitration context, a federal interest is at stake: the enforceability of
arbitration agreements under the FAA.
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agreement, 238 nor are parties likely to address it in their arbitration agreement.
Thus, the Maryland rule likely would not be preempted under the RUAA theory
and the Pro-Contract theory. However, the Maryland rule may be deemed "antiFAA" because it rejects the FAA approach (in a manner less favorable to
arbitration as well), and so arguably it would be preempted under the Anti-FAA
theory.239
CONCLUSION

It has now been twenty years since the Supreme Court decided Southland
Corp. v. Keating,24 in which it first held that the Federal Arbitration Act applies in
state court and preempts state law. This is a good time to take stock of the legal
doctrine that has developed. Some fundamental principles of FAA preemption are
resolved: State laws that single out arbitration are preempted when they invalidate
arbitration agreements; general contract law defenses, even when applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements, ordinarily are not preempted; and parties can
incorporate by reference state arbitration laws into their contracts and avoid FAA
preemption.
As the analytical framework developed here illustrates, however, a number of
issues remain unsettled, even after twenty years. The lower courts are divided on
whether the FAA preempts state laws that apply to arbitration agreements and to
some other contract clauses, but not to contracts generally. Questions remain to be
answered as to when general contract law defenses, while ordinarily saved from
preemption, may nonetheless single out arbitration agreements and be preempted
after all. Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court still has to decide how to
deal with "second generation" FAA preemption cases-cases involving state laws
that regulate the arbitration process rather than invalidating the parties' arbitration
agreement. This Article identifies and categorizes five alternative theories for
deciding such cases. One might expect the Court to favor one of the narrower
theories (i.e., one that preempts fewer state laws), as contract law is an area
traditionally occupied by the states and so the presumption against preemption
would apply.24 1 But given the notable absence of the presumption in the Court's
FAA preemption decisions to date, 242 that may be an unrealistic expectation.

238. It may be that the RUAA drafters viewed appealability standards as presenting a
"'front-end' issue," as the standards arguably involve "questions raised when a party
attempts to evade an otherwise valid arbitration contract," Hayford, supra note 17, at 74, but
I have found no clear indication to that effect in their published writings. The closest is a
statement in Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 17, at 181, describing appealability standards as
"[a]t the back end" of the FAA, but not mentioning RUAA.
239. See 1 MACNEIL Er AL., supra note 17, § 10.8.2.4, at 10:95-10:96 (concluding that
state court decision, which applied state law time limit for vacatur action instead of shorter
FAA time limit, was "wrong but, fortunately, rare"; and that because state "allows a longer
period its act should have been recognized as limiting the FAA improperly").
240. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
242. Except, of course, in the dissents.

